

or vice versa, had no such limitation, particularly the small craft that the author notes were used on this run: the courses and wind patterns enabled them to leave by and large throughout the year. This important chronological difference clarifies the author's seemingly cryptic words. He is reporting that

There is imported<sup>14</sup> by these places all the [sc. western] trade goods imported by Limyrikê, and, generally speaking, there comes to them all year round [sc. and not just at a certain time, like the western goods] both the cash originating from Egypt [sc. paid by western merchants in exchange for east coast products] and most kinds of all the goods originating from Limyrikê.

New York University

LIONEL CASSON

<sup>14</sup> The author throughout uses *προχωρεῖ* to mean 'there is imported'; cf. Frisk, p. 101. This sense, occurring nowhere else in Greek literature, may well be businessman's jargon.

### PREVERBS AND DOWRIES\*

A fairly frequent syntactic phenomenon both of Greek and of Latin is, in the words of Calvert Watkins,<sup>1</sup> 'the iteration of a compound verb in a succeeding clause or sentence by the simple verb alone, but with the semantic force of the compound'. A straightforward example is provided by Ar. *Knights* 365–6:

Πα. ἐγὼ δέ γ' ἐξέλω σε τῆς πυγῆς θύραζε κύβδα.  
Δη. νῆ τὸν Ποσειδῶ κάμει γ' ἄρ', ἥνπερ γε τοῦτον ἔλκεης.

More complex is an inscription (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 43.35–44) cited by Watkins, in which not only are two compound verbs picked up by their respective simplexes, but one of the simplexes (τιθῆται) only becomes unambiguously intelligible when it is seen that it has to be taken in the sense properly belonging to the compound (ὑποθεμένῳ 'taking as security for a loan') that was used a line or two earlier:

ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκο ἀρχον[τ]ος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσ[ί]α Ἀθηναίων μηθενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν τ[α]ίς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χωρίον μήτε πριαμένῳ μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηθενί· ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνήται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τιθῆται τρόπῳ ὁπωδὴν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βολομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of the present note is to draw attention to a group of passages which may be unnoticed instances of this idiom. All involve the verb ἐπιδιδόναι 'give in addition to (a woman being given in marriage), give as dowry' and its simplex δίδοναι. The first is an unproblematical example, notable only for the fact that having followed up the compound with the simplex, the speaker then returns to the compound:<sup>3</sup>

\* I am grateful to Professor Douglas MacDowell for his criticism and encouragement, and to an anonymous *CQ* referee for some constructive suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> *HSCP* 71 (1966), 115–19, at p. 115. Watkins gives references to earlier scholars who have collected instances of the idiom; further examples are adduced by R. Renehan, *Greek Textual Criticism: A Reader* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 77–85.

<sup>2</sup> The same verb ὑποτίθεσθαι, and its suppletive perfect passive ὑποκείσθαι, figure on two Attic *horoi* (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 2758/9) which neatly demonstrate that the omission of the preverb is entirely optional and has no effect on the sense. 2758 reads ὅρος χωρίου καὶ οἰκίας ὑποκειμένων ἹΗΗΗ δραχ(μῶν) ὥστε ἔχειν καὶ κρατεῖν [τὸν] θέμενον κατὰ συνθήκας τὰς κειμένας παρὰ Δεινίᾳ Εὐωνυμεί: in 2759 the mortgagee is given 'possession and control' by almost precisely the same formula – but he is called [τὸν] ὑποθέμενον.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Renehan (n. 1), 79, citing Pl. *Symp.* 211b–c and plausibly emending Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.54.

**(1) The marriages of Kiron's daughter (Isaios 8.8)**

ἐκδίδωσιν αὐτὴν Ναυσιμένει Χολαργεῖ, σὺν ἱματίοις καὶ χρυσίοις πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι μνᾶς ἐπιδούς. κάκεῖνος μὲν τρισὶν ἢ τέτταρσιν ἔτεσι μετὰ ταῦτα καμὼν ἀποθνήσκει, πρὶν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι παῖδας ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας μητρός· ὁ δὲ πάππος κοιμισάμενος αὐτὴν, καὶ τὴν προῖκα οὐκ ἀπολαβὼν ὅσῃν ἔδωκε διὰ τὴν Ναυσιμένους ἀπορίαν τῶν πραγμάτων, πάλιν ἐκδίδωσι τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ καὶ χιλίας δραχμὰς προῖκ' ἐπιδίδωσι.<sup>4</sup>

Contrast Isaios 2.5 where the compound is repeated in full: τὴν ἴσῃν προῖκα ἐπιδόντες ἥνπερ καὶ τῇ πρεσβυτέρᾳ ἀδελφῇ ἐπέδομεν.

The remaining three passages are concerned with financial arrangements made by husbands who, either on divorce or by last will, make provision for the remarriage of their wives. In each passage the verb ἐπιδιδόναι is followed at a short interval by the simplex δίδοναι, and in each case the compound has as its object a dowry (whose value is given) and the simplex an expression referring to, or including, the clothing, jewellery, etc. (often termed a 'trousseau' in recent discussions) which the wife was to take with her to her new husband.

The exact legal status of this 'trousseau' has been a matter of dispute among scholars,<sup>5</sup> and the passages now to be cited have been used as evidence to support more than one conclusion. In abstract principle, the 'trousseau' might have been regarded (i) as part of the dowry, (ii) as being unconditionally given to the husband, or (iii) as being unconditionally given to the wife. It is clear from Isaios 3.35<sup>6</sup> that the 'trousseau', and indeed any other property that changed hands on the occasion of a marriage, was legally part of the dowry, and therefore returnable in the event of divorce, if and only if it was formally included in the valuation of the dowry. Wolff<sup>7</sup> claimed that it was never so included, Schaps<sup>8</sup> that it sometimes was and sometimes was not. But if the 'trousseau' was not part of the dowry, to whom did it legally belong? If δίδοναι is taken at its face value, our three passages seem on this point to be self-contradictory. On the one hand the husbands assume that their wives' clothing and jewellery is *their* property (else how could they give it to anyone?); on the other hand they appear to be stipulating that in the second marriage it will become the property of the wife. It is not surprising that Wolff changed his mind on the matter<sup>9</sup> and that Schaps is unable to make up his mind.<sup>10</sup> Let us examine the passages.

<sup>4</sup> ἐπιδίδωσι is Reiske's conjecture (ἀποδίδωσι cod. unicus), but certain: Kiron could not 'give back' a dowry to a man who had not previously possessed it.

<sup>5</sup> See H. J. Wolff, *Traditio* 2 (1944), 54–8 (German version, with updated notes, in Wolff, *Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Altgriechenlands und des hellenistisch-römische Ägypten* [Weimar, 1961], 174–9); H. J. Wolff, *RE* xxiii<sup>1</sup> (1957), 137–9; A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* 1 (Oxford, 1968), 47; D. M. Schaps, *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh, 1979), 10–12, 101–5.

<sup>6</sup> εἰάν τις τι ἀτίμητον δῶ, ἔνεκα τοῦ νόμου, εἰάν ἀπολίπη ἡ γυνὴ τὸν ἄνδρα ἢ εἰάν ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκπέμψῃ τὴν γυναῖκα, οὐκ ἔξεστι πράξασθαι τῷ δόντι ὃ μὴ ἐν προικὶ τιμήσας ἔδωκεν.

<sup>7</sup> Wolff (n. 5), locc. cit.

<sup>8</sup> Schaps (n. 5), 10, 101–5.

<sup>9</sup> In his *Traditio* paper ([1944] 57 = [1961] 178) Wolff spoke of the clothing and jewellery as being given 'to the bride herself'; in his *RE* article, on the other hand, he describes them as 'appurtenances' ('Zubehör') of the wife, which 'came with her to the husband' and automatically went with her *from* the husband in the event of divorce.

<sup>10</sup> Schaps (n. 5), 11 ('the trousseau... belonged to [the husband] permanently'), 12 ('once the marriage was terminated... the return of the trousseau... could take place by direct gift to [the woman]').

## (2) The will of Pasion ([Dem.] 45.28)

τάδε διέθετο Πασίων Ἀχαρνεύς· δίδωμι τὴν ἐμαντοῦ γυναῖκα Ἀρχίππην Φορμίωνι, καὶ προῖκα ἐπιδίδωμι Ἀρχίππῃ τάλαντον μὲν τὸ ἐκ Πεπαρήθου, τάλαντον δὲ τὸ αὐτόθεν, συνοικίαν ἑκατὸν μνῶν, θεραπαίνας καὶ τὰ χρυσία καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἔνδον· ἅπαντα ταῦτα Ἀρχίππῃ δίδωμι.

‘It is not clear in this case,’ remarks Schaps,<sup>11</sup> ‘where the dowry ends and the gift to Archippe begins, but it is certain that *epididōmi*, the normal expression for giving a dowry “along with” a woman as used in the beginning of the passage, cannot be equivalent to *Archippēi didōmi*, “I give to Archippe” at the end.’ But while it is certainly true that the compound verb cannot be understood as equivalent to the simplex, the simplex *can*, by virtue of the idiom we are considering, be understood as equivalent to the compound. And two considerations tend to indicate that it should indeed be so understood. In the first place there is the fact, duly noted by Schaps, that if the ‘dowry’ and the ‘gift’ were meant to be distinct transfers, one to Phormion and the other to Archippe, it is impossible to tell where one ends and the other begins; yet it would have been easy for Pasion to make such a distinction clear, had he intended there to be one, by writing e.g. *προῖκα μὲν . . . καὶ συνοικίαν . . . θεραπαίνας δὲ* or, as the case might be, *προῖκα μὲν . . . συνοικίαν δὲ . . . καὶ θεραπαίνας*.<sup>12</sup> Secondly there is the comment made by the speaker, Apollodoros, on the will (or, as he would say, the alleged will) after he has had it read. As Finley once pointed out,<sup>13</sup> Apollodoros in this comment makes no distinction between a ‘dowry’ and a ‘trousseau’, but treats all the property mentioned as constituting Archippe’s *προίξ*:

ἡκούσατ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ πλῆθος τῆς προικός, τάλαντον ἐκ Πεπαρήθου, τάλαντον αὐτόθεν, συνοικίαν ἑκατὸν μνῶν, θεραπαίνας καὶ χρυσία, καὶ τᾶλλα, φησίν, ὅς’ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ δίδωμι.

It will be noted that although the entire list of items is introduced as *τὸ πλῆθος τῆς προικός*, the verb used to describe Pasion’s action is not ‘the normal expression’ *ἐπιδίδωμι* but *δίδωμι*. Clearly Apollodorus is presenting the list as one list, not two, and is treating the simple verb as semantically equivalent, in this context, to the compound. It might be argued that he was doing this with intent to mislead, trying to exaggerate the amount of the ‘dowry’ and conceal the existence of the ‘gift’ in order to bolster his allegation that Phormion had fabricated the will in his own interests; but in that case one would have expected him to highlight the verb *ἐπιδίδωμι* rather than *δίδωμι*, since that would make much clearer the implication, which *ex hypothesi* he would be trying to convey, that the will placed all the property mentioned in Phormion’s hands. His choice of *δίδωμι* suggests that he was not trying to wrest the phrasing of the will, and that his interpretation of it was a legitimate one. And since it is also the only interpretation that can save the will from a serious ambiguity (of

<sup>11</sup> Schaps (n. 5), 11.

<sup>12</sup> Wolff in both his discussions (see n. 5) tries to obviate the ambiguity by placing a strong stop before *θεραπαίνας*, forgetting apparently that this modern convenience was not available to Pasion.

<sup>13</sup> M. I. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1952), 243 n. 53. Harrison (n. 5), 47 n. 1 is wrong to say that in a later paper (*Seminar* 12 [1954], 23 n. 58) Finley ‘withdrew and accepted Wolff’s interpretation’: in fact Finley (rightly) withdrew his suggestion that *ἐπιδίδωμι Ἀρχίππῃ* meant ‘I further give to Archippe’ and accepted that the meaning of the phrase was ‘I give *along with* Archippe’, but beyond that he gave no indication of how he would now interpret the passage.

which one would be reluctant to convict so shrewd and successful a businessman as Pasion), it should be taken to represent the testator's intentions. The concluding phrase *ἅπαντα ταῦτα Ἀρχίππῃ δίδωμι* (= *ἐπιδίδωμι*) will have served to make a clear separation between the list that precedes it, specifying the property which was to come into Phormion's possession when he married Archippe,<sup>14</sup> and the disposition of Pasion's other property which presumably followed and which Apollodoros does not have read to the jury. The section which he did have read may be translated thus:

This is the will of Pasion of Acharnai: I give my wife Archippe to Phormion, and I give with Archippe as dowry the one talent <owed> at Peparethos and the one talent <owed> at Athens, an apartment house worth 100 mnai, maidservants and the jewellery and everything else in the house which is hers. All these I give with Archippe....

### (3) The divorce of Menekles (Isaios 2.9)

καὶ οὕτως ἐκδίδομεν αὐτὴν Ἡλείῳ Σφηττίῳ, καὶ ὁ Μενεκλῆς τήν τε προῖκα ἐπιδίδωσιν αὐτῇ,<sup>15</sup> μετασχὼν τοῦ οἴκου τῆς μισθώσεως τῶν παίδων τῶν Νικίου, καὶ τὰ ἱματῖα ἃ ἦλθεν ἔχουσα παρ' ἐκείνων, καὶ τὰ χρυσίδα, ἃ ἦν, δίδωσιν αὐτῇ.

Tyrwhitt's conjecture (see n. 15) makes this passage parallel, so far as the two verbal phrases are concerned, with (1), and it may be understood in the same way:

And so we gave her in marriage to Eleios of Sphettos, and Menekles gave the dowry<sup>16</sup> with her (having become joint lessee of the estate of the children of Nikias), and the clothing which she had brought with her to his house, and the jewellery which she had, he gave with her.

On this interpretation of the passage, the repetition of *δίδωσιν αὐτῇ* is not strictly necessary for grammar or sense; it is an aid to clarity, added because the insertion of the participial phrase *μετασχὼν... Νικίου* has sundered *τὰ ἱματῖα... καὶ τὰ χρυσίδα* from the compound verb which would otherwise have governed them. No more here than in (2) is any attempt made to distinguish an outright 'gift' from a 'dowry' by the addition of such an adverb as *καθάπαξ*.

### (4) The will of Diodotos (Lysias 32.6)

ἐπέσκηψε δέ, ἐάν τι πάθῃ, τάλαντον μὲν ἐπιδούναι τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ δοῦναι, τάλαντον δὲ τῇ θυγατρὶ κατέλιπε <δὲ> καὶ εἴκοσι μνᾶς τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ τριάκοντα στατήρας Κυζικηνούς.

<sup>14</sup> I do not say 'the property which was to constitute Archippe's dowry', since only the first three items are assigned a value and only they, therefore, were capable of being part of her *προίξ* in the legal sense (cf. n. 6); Apollodoros in speaking of *τὸ πλήθος τῆς προικός* is using the term loosely.

<sup>15</sup> ἐπιδίδ. αὐτῇ Tyrwhitt: ἐπιδίδ. αὐτῷ codd.: ἀποδίδ. αὐτῷ Jenicke: ἀποδίδ. αὐτῆς Buermann: ἀποδίδωσιν (del. αὐτῷ) Scheibe. There can be no doubt that ἐπιδίδωσιν is correct. One ἐπιδίδωσι a dowry to a woman's husband at the time of her marriage; one ἀποδίδωσι a dowry either to her next of kin upon divorce (cf. [Dem.] 59.52) or when an agreement has been made that the dowry shall not be paid immediately upon marriage but shall become a debt to be paid later (as in Dem. 30.7–8). Here the latter sense of ἀποδίδωσι is irrelevant, and the former is not appropriate when the giving of the dowry is being mentioned in direct connection, not with the divorce, but with the remarriage. The manuscripts' αὐτῷ could be right, but is a little clumsy when all the other unemphatic or unexpressed pronouns in the sentence (αὐτήν, αὐτῇ, the subject of ἦλθεν and the dative governed by ἦν) refer or would refer to Menekles' ex-wife.

<sup>16</sup> That is, the dowry (twenty mnai) which he had received when he married her (§5).

A clear distinction is made here between, on the one hand, the two dowries of a talent each, and on the other hand the 20 mnai plus 30 Kyzikene staters which Diodotos 'left' to his wife. This distinction can be followed out in the speaker's account of subsequent events. The wife's dowry (less 1000 drachmai) was given with her on her remarriage (§8). The daughter's dowry was presumably given with her on her marriage to the speaker (§2); at any rate he does not, in the surviving portion of the speech, allege that it has not been paid or not been paid in full. The money 'left' to the wife was handed over by her to her father Diogeiton, the brother of Diodotos (§15); and when Diodotos' elder son came of age, Diogeiton declared that this precise sum had been the amount left by Diodotos to his sons, but that it had all been spent on their upbringing and their sister's (§9). It would thus appear that the 20 mnai plus 30 Kyzikenes never passed, and were not expected to pass, into the control of the woman's second husband: they may reasonably be described as a 'gift' or 'bequest', even though the woman could not invest the money herself and handed it over to her current *kyrios* (her father) as soon as it became hers.

There remains τὰ ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ, presumably more or less equivalent to the *ἰμάτια καὶ χρυσί(δι)α* of other passages. By the order of phrases this item is closely associated not with the 'bequest', but with the wife's dowry; and though it is not stated in §8 that she was allowed to take these personal possessions with her to her second husband's house, no complaint is made that she was not. We may therefore assume that its fate was, and was intended to be, the same as that of the dowry; and while there is a slightly stronger case here than in (2) and (3) for supposing that *δοῦναι* may mean something different from *ἐπιδοῦναι* (since *δοῦναι* might otherwise have been omitted without detriment to sense or intelligibility),<sup>17</sup> the general parallelism of phraseology between this passage and the other two suggests that we should interpret it similarly:

He charged <his brother> that, if anything should happen to him, he should give with his wife <on her remarriage> a talent <as dowry> and also give with her the contents of her room, and <give> a talent with the daughter; and in addition he left to his wife twenty mnai and thirty Kyzikene staters.

It appears, therefore, that the available evidence<sup>18</sup> is at least consistent with the conclusion that a bride's 'trousseau', even if it was not always *valued* explicitly as part of the dowry, always was given, like the dowry, *with* the bride rather than *to* her, and belonged to her only in the same sense in which the wife of the speaker of Dem. 47 asserted that certain furniture was 'hers' because it had been part of her dowry.<sup>19</sup> It does not follow that it would have been legally *impossible* to make an outright gift

<sup>17</sup> One grammatical point, however, may tell in favour of taking *δοῦναι* as equivalent to *ἐπιδοῦναι*: namely that if *δοῦναι* meant 'to give outright' one would expect *αὐτῇ* to be added. For one could hardly understand *αὐτῇ* out of *τῇ γυναικί* just before, since the two datives would be of quite different kinds – the first comitative and governed by *ἐπι*-, the second a dative of the recipient governed by *δοῦναι*.

<sup>18</sup> For the other relevant evidence see Schaps (n. 5), 101–5. I leave aside Men. *Koneiazomenai* 2–5, which cannot be used as evidence given the tattered state of the text and the uncertainty as to how it should be supplemented; though the supplements proposed by Sandbach (in the 1972 Oxford text), the most plausible yet suggested, make the verb *ἐπιδιδόναι* govern *both* a dowry and a 'trousseau' as objects, in full conformity with the interpretations here advanced of passages from the orators ([*δίδωσι τὴν κόρην*] *τάλαντα πένθ' ἅμα* [*προίκ' ἐπιδιδούς καὶ κόσμον*]). Note that the semantically related verb *ἐπιφέρεισθαι* is used in Plut. *Sol.* 20.6 with reference primarily to 'trousseaux' (*τῶν δ' ἄλλων γάμων ἀφείλε τὰς φερνὰς, ἰμάτια τρία καὶ σκεύη μικροῦ τιμήματος ἄξια κελεύσας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν, ἐπιφέρεισθαι τὴν γαμουμένην*).

<sup>19</sup> Dem. 47.57.

to a bride;<sup>20</sup> but it looks as though it may have been something that people just did not do.<sup>21</sup>

University of Nottingham

ALAN H. SOMMERSTEIN

<sup>20</sup> I am indebted to Professor MacDowell for emphasizing this point: 'there is no doubt', he writes, 'that it was possible for an Athenian woman to own things (cf. Lys. 32.6 *κατέλιπε*...), so that, if her father or other relative wished to give her something on the occasion of her marriage, I do not see how that can have been legally impossible, even if we do not happen to know of an instance'.

<sup>21</sup> When Plato in the *Laws* prohibits dowries (5.742c) but allows the bride's *kyrios* to make a gift of limited value *ἐσθῆτος χάριν* (6.774d), he assumes that such a gift would be made to the husband, not the wife; for if the value of the gift exceeds the prescribed limit, *ὁ... διδοὺς ἢ λαμβάνων* (n.b. masculine) is liable to punishment.

### SENECA'S NEIGHBOUR, THE ORGAN TUNER

In one of his letters to Lucilius (Book 6, *Ep.* 56), Seneca discusses the effects of noise and silence on study and contemplation. In the opening sections of the letter, he reveals that his current lodging is located above a bathhouse whence issue continually all sorts of irritating sounds. Seneca insists that such noises, despite their persistence, present no real distraction to one who possesses inner peace and a clear, untroubled mind (*animum enim cogo sibi intentum esse nec avocari ad externa: omnia licet foris resonent, dum intus nihil tumultus sit*, §5) and whose thoughts are 'good, steadfast, and sure' (*nullus hominum aviumque concentus interrumpet cogitationes bonas solidasque iam et certas*, §11).

In discussing the nature of distracting sounds (§4), Seneca rightly insists that it is the voice and words which demand one's attention and engage one's soul; mere din is no barrier to concentration. Among the sounds which he considers not distracting are passing carriages (*essedae transcurrentes*), a neighbouring craftsman (*faber inquilinus*), a saw-sharpener (*serrarius*), and another fellow *qui ad Metam Sudantem tabulas experitur et tibias, nec cantat sed exclamat*. Editors and commentators have generally accepted Gruter's emendation of the manuscripts' *tabulas* to *tubulas*, i.e. small *tubae*;<sup>1</sup> the word *tubula*, however, is attested nowhere else in Latin literature,<sup>2</sup> and one wonders why Seneca would have preferred it to *tubas* here.<sup>3</sup>

Seventy-five years ago Walter C. Summers offered a cleverer solution.<sup>4</sup> Maintaining that the mention of the *Meta Sudans*, the 'Sweating (i.e. Trickling) Fountain',<sup>5</sup> has some special point ('why should a tuner of musical instruments be found near one?'), Summers proposed reading *tubulos*, 'the regular word for waterpipes, of which this

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. Otto Hense (Teubner, 1914), 171; Achilles Beltrami (Brescia, 1916), 179; Richard M. Gummere (Loeb, 1917), 374; François Préchac (Budé, 1958), 62; L. D. Reynolds (Oxford, 1965), 148.

<sup>2</sup> See *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, edited by P. G. W. Glare (Oxford, 1982) s.v. *tubula*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., *Ep.* 90.26 in which Seneca writes *per tubam ac tibiam*.

<sup>4</sup> *Select Letters of Seneca* (London, 1910, reprinted 1965), 62–3 n. 7.

<sup>5</sup> The name of this fountain is descriptive of its appearance, resembling a goal in the circus (*meta*), flowing, spraying, or 'sweating' jets of water (*sudans*). The *Meta Sudans* in Rome stood between the Arch of Constantine and the Colosseum at the meeting point of the five regions of Augustus, I, II, III, IV, X. After thorough excavation in 1933, Mussolini removed the remains in 1936 to construct for his fascist parades the great street which passes through the imperial fora area. See Samuel B. Platner and Thomas Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 1929), 340–1; Ernest Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (New York, 1962), II.61–3; Raymond L. DenAdel, 'Seneca the Younger and the *Meta Sudans*', *CB* 60 (1984), 1–4; Filippo Coarelli, *Guida Archeologica di Roma* (Milan, 1975), 175.